Michigan Law Review
Volume 77

Issue 3

1979

Legal Realism and Historical Method: J. Willard Hurst and
American Legal History
Stephen Diamond
Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Stephen Diamond, Legal Realism and Historical Method: J. Willard Hurst and American Legal History, 77
MICH. L. REV. 784 (1979).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol77/iss3/31

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

LEGAL REALISM AND HISTORICAL
METHOD: J. WILLARD HURST AND
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
Stephen Diamond*

By James
Willard Hurst. Ithaca, New York. Cornell University Press. 1977.
Pp. 318. $17 .50.
.
For many years, J. Willard Hurst has been the dominant
figure in American legal history. He is one of the few legal historians whose work has been enthusiastically received both by professional historians and by lawyers. Historians have traditionally
insisted upon a research monograph as an entrance credential
into their community and Hurst has produced a massive and
impressive example of such a work. 1 ffurst and his students have
analyzed in detail the interaction between law and particular
economic activities in nineteenth-century Wisconsin. 2
Lawyers, on the other hand, have typically applauded histories of their subject that are broad in scope, believing that without great effort (and thus usually with little attention to primary
materials), they can grasp the main themes in the evolution of
their discipline. Such synoptic overviews have frequently been
presented first as a series of lectures, among the most notable
being works by Holmes, by Pound, and by Gilmore. 3
·
Hurst has himself contributed greatly to this tradition. In
Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century
United States (1956) he summed up a century of legal development in the phrase, "the release of energy"-a theme now familiar even to those who have not read Hurst's book. In Law and
Social Process in United States History (1960) the scope was even
broader-the entire national period of American history-as was
his task understanding the role of law in America. Hurst's most
LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES.
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recent book, Law and Social Order in the United States, 4 is an
equally ambitious effort. Not surprisingly, much of it is a recapitulation and condensation of his earlier works, which are
frequently cited in the footnotes.
Since Hurst has so significantly determined the direction
and shaped the structure of recent writing about American legal
history, it is perhaps somewhat difficult to remember that he too
was the product of a certain time, of certain attitudes and interests, in American legal studies. Hurst is in many ways the product of legal realism, loosely defined. Like the realists, he has
emphasized the relationship between law and society; legal history could not simply chronicle the emergence and development
of legal doctrines, nor treat them largely as intellectual insights
divorced from the actual world in which they occurred. Hurst,
like the realists, minimizes the autonomy of law; law rather reflects changes in society, most often or most critically, changes
in the economy. With realism, "Cases & Mate:i;ials on . . . " replaced "Cases on . . . " as the standard law textbook title. This
often, however, meant only the inclusion of descriptions of the
legislative or administrative process. This approach broadened
the scope of legal research, but preserved, as the domain of legal
academics, law as a subject distinct from the social sciences in
general.
Much like the realists, Hurst, even as he insists that law be
seen in a larger social context, devotes himself almost entirely to
an analysis of legal materials. He examines trial court results,
statutory materials, and executive acttons, particularly those
taken by administrative agencies as well as appellate opinions. In
doing so he at least implicitly adopts Roscoe Pound's rather formal definition of law as the product of just such governmental
institutions, as the systematic application of force by politically
organized society. Hurst calls this "the operation of distinctive
. . . legal agencies. " 5
Hurst similarly reflects the realist denigration of the importance of courts, as against other branches of government, in the
creation of law. 6 This attitude described both the real and the
ideal to many liberal academics in the 1930s, as it was a conclusion which supported opposition to judicial interference with legislative decisions. Hurst somewhat anachronistically continues to
insist that the courts are relatively unimportant in spite of the
clear evidence of the growing influence of federal courts over more
4. J.

HURST, LAW AND SocIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES

as LAW AND SocIAL ORDER].

5. Id. at 25.
6. Id. at 38, 100, 132-43, 186-87.

(1977) [hereinafter cited
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and more aspects of contemporary American society.7
Hurst again reflects the realist tradition in his emphasis
upon the relationship between law and the market and his relative lack of interest in other social institutions. Although Hurst
has written at length about the American commitment to individualism, particularly as it relates to economic behavior, he has
almost entirely ignored the family and religion, both institutions
whose study would test the depth and breadth of this commitment. Hurst assumes that, after 1800, the market was the sole
object of interest for Americans, apparently because, in the
nineteenth century, they concentrated entirely upon accumulating wealth, and in the twentieth century upon enjoying what it
brought. 8
·other issues, however, did hold the attention of Americans.
The nature and role of government was still problematic, and the
frequent state constitutional conventions attest to strong yet
divided opinions about government beyond its effect on the
market. 9 Suffrage, apportionment, slavery, prohibition, and
civil rights were all at various times issues of great moment, and
ones to which Hurst devotes little attention. It has been noted
that Hurst's focus upon the relation between law and the market
-a subject on which he has shaped the structure of subsequent
research and analysis-minimizes any harmful consequences of
his failure to use extra-legal materials. 10 The legal materials
themselves present a relatively clear picture of economic behavior-despite the cautioning of realists and their descendants that
contract law in the abstract is often a poor guide to business
behavior. The relation between law and the family, a social institution still relatively less influenced by and described in legal
materials, could not be so studied without greater recourse to
extra-legal sources.
Law and the Social Order recapitulates the sequence of
Hurst's publications. The book is divided into four chapters. The
first presents a strategy for legal history; the second records the
development of legal agencies in America; the last two chapters
7. See G. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 15. It is not unfair to emphasize here the recent
influence of federal courts because Hurst focuses his presentation of twentieth-century
developments on national, rather than state, law.
8. LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 4, at 125. See Scheiber, At the Borderland of
Law and Economic History: The Contributions of Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HlsT. REV, 744,
752 (1970).
9. Scheiber, supra note 8, at 752-53.
10. See Gordon, J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal
Historiography, 10 LAw & Socv. REv. 9, 52-53 (1975).
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finally turn to the substance of legal doctrine. Hurst first published "Legal History: A Research Program"; 11 he next wrote The
Growth of American Law; The Law Makers (1950), a lengthy
history of the development of the branches of government; and
then in Law and Economic Growth and, in a more discursive
form, in Ldw and the Conditions of Freedom (1956), he examined
legal decisions themselves rather than the bodies that made
them.
In Chapter I, in which Hurst attempts to define the subject
of legal history, his adoption of Pound's approach to law as the
product of governmental institutions has the merit of limiting the
scope of the legal historian's enterprise. It does, however, confine
a scholar who insists that law be examined in relation to society
in general. Hurst recognizes this, and thus, includes a section in
this chapter entitled, "Although the operation of legal agencies
provided the core of legal history, realism requires also a history
of law's relation to other institutions and ideas." Hurst here
avoids the pitfalls of an unduly restrictive definition of his subject, but does so at a level of abstraction that leaves little content
to the generalizations that remain.
There are other instances in which Hurst presents a broad
principle and then qualifies it with its negation. He reiterates his
view that the principle underlying much nineteenth-century law
was the "release of energy," a belief in individualism and in entrepreneurial activity as the basis of economic growth. But he
does not conclude with such a sweeping overstatement. He also
finds in nineteenth-century law the principle of constitutionalism, "a stubbornly persistent demand that all organized power
be accountable to others than the immediate powerholders for the
quality of the ends and means of using power. " 12 This principle,
which emerged as a limitation on governmental power, was also
applied to private power. Hurst has thus provided a principle
and a counter-principle. Individual activity is to be encouraged,
but it is to be evaluated by social norms. The analysis thus retains subtlety, but at the cost of indeterminacy. Content can be
given to the operation of these two principles only by a more
precise examination of their applicability in a particular context.
In Chapter II, Hurst describes legal decision-makers with a
realist's emphasis upon legislatures and administrative agencies.
In Chapter ill, he turns his attention to the substance of legal
11. Hurst, Legal History: A Research Program, 1942 Wis. L. R.Ev. 323.
12. LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 4, at 45.
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decisions, in particular to the relationship between science and
technology and the law. The choice of this topic-the relationship
between man and his environment-to introduce the treatment
of substantive law itself recapitulates the evolution of Hurst's
publications. 13 This approach generally emphasizes the technical
and technological rather than the political content of the problems legal agencies face.
Hurst in general thinks that bad decisions are not caused by
favoritism or political preference, so much as by a lack of information and foresight. For him, the opposite of consensus is drift
and inertia; the opposite of agreement is not disagreement, but
ignorance and confusion. He criticizes courts because they easily
lose sight of affected interests not represented by the opposing
parties, and he criticizes legislatures for not gathering information as well as they could.
Hurst is most critical of nineteenth-century law for its failure
to overcome a contemporary tendency to favor short-run results
at the expense of long-run interests, an attitude he describes as
"bastard pragmatism." Law is not autonomous; its task is not to
make society's choices but, in a role similar to that given economics by many of its modern practitioners, it is at least to make
society aware of the true costs involved in its choices. 14 H, as
Hurst argues, law is a method for the national exploitation of the
physical environment, difficult problems of distributional choice
can be avoided as long as productivity is increased. Hurst finds
this technique has typified American law in general; it is an approach of which he apparently approves. 15 To the extent that
social conflicts-the confrontation of groups-erupt, they are
implicit generational ones, as bastard pragmatists with a shortrun view impose costs upon their descendants; they are not contemporaneous social divisions, which are explicit and articulated.
In its first three chapters, Law and Social Order clearly
tracks Hurst's earlier work, presenting it in summary form. In the
13. In LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 1, Hurst analyzed in detail the effect
of law on the exploitation of Wisconsin's timber resources in the nineteenth century.
14. Here, again, Hurst reflects his realist heritage. For the realists, it was easy to
announce that law should reflect contemporary values when the Supreme Court was, in
some celebrated cases, rejecting such values as expressed in legislative decisions and
instead enacting "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." The extent to which law could
be used to initiate change, not to reflect a social consensus, but to create one, was a subject
on which realists remained ambiguous and tentative.
15. In this context Hart and Sacks discuss the fallacy of the static pie. On the relation
between Hurst and what loosely can be called the legal-process school, see Tushnet,
Lumber and the Legal Process, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 114, 115 n.7.
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final chapter, "Consensus and Conflict," Hurst looks not at the
relationship between man and his environment, but at relations
between groups of men. The emphasis, of necessity, is less on
technology and more on politics. This is new, a substitution of
consensus-conflict for the consensus-inertia polarity that Hurst
employed in the past. There is at least now the suggestion that
profound disagreement rather than haste, inadvertence, or ignorance might sometimes explain the failure to consider what Hurst
would deem all of the relevant factors in reaching·a decision.
This chapter appears to be Hurst's response to criticism that
he has exaggerated the element of consensus in American history,
that he has written the victors' view of history, and failed to
consider contemporary opposition to the nineteenth-century use
of law to facilitate market capitalism and generate economic
growth. Hurst may in particular have been reacting to Morton
Horwitz's The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860
(1977). 16 Horwitz explores much of the same ground as
Hurst-the relation between law and the economy in the nineteenth century-but appears to offer a very different interpretation, one which, according to Hurst, stresses conflict rather than
consensus. 17
While Hurst has now formally recognized conflict as a possible explanation of various aspects of American society and of its
law, he is actually much more confident in and comfortable with
a consensus approach. It is not simply that Hurst believes that
American development has been dominated by a consensus on
middle-class values. 18 That is a substantive conclusion which may
well be justified; it is, at any rate, one that is shared by many
others. Hurst, however, goes further; his. very definition of
"consensus" almost inevitably leads to the conclusion that consensus has dominated the American experience. Consensus, as
used by Hurst, included situations in which there is disagreement, or no agreement; it can comprehend near-unanimity of
sentiment and the absence of strong disagreement. Given Hurst's
terminology, there appears to be no issue so divisive it cannot be
described as demonstrating a consensus of a sort. When discussing state abandonment of corporate regulation in the late nine16. While both books were published in 1977, many chapters of Horwitz's book had
earlier appeared in various journals and the thrust of his argument was certainly wellknown to Hurst at the time he delivered the lectures at Cornell, in April 1976, which later
became LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 4.
17. See Hurst, Book Review, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 175 (1977).
18. See LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 4, at 43-44, 64.
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teenth century and interstate rivalry, especially between Delaware and New Jersey to be corporate refuges, Hurst refers to an
"evident prevailing consensus" on this issue. 19 He apparently
cannot fully accept the existence of a widely shared confidence
in unrestrained corporate activity. There is, after all, well-known
nonlegal muckraking and trust-busting literature that clearly
suggests disagreement on the issue of corporate power. The actions of the federal government also suggest that state laws did
not reflect a unanimity of approach. 20
Although Hurst seems more comfortable focusing upon consensus, he does maintain that many situations in American law
reflected varying degrees of both consensus and conflict. Laws to
regulate hunting emerged, he suggests, from the pressures exerted
by hunters and in the absence of any clear expression of view by
those not directly concerned. 21 In effect, hunting laws exemplified
what Hurst has generally called inertia and drift. Hurst then
presents the case of competition between railroad and trucking
interests, as the former attempted to thwart the latter's requests
for authorization to carry larger loads. There were clear adversaries here and it was thus less likely that a decision would result
from drift, from a failure to have its possible adverse consequences clearly articulated. What conflicts existed, however,
were between two parties competing in a game, the rules of which
they both accepted. They did not criticize the game itself. Hurst
describes this as a situation in which there were adversarial interests, but a consensus that the legal processes should resolve the
issue. Any litigation would, by this standard, apparently reflect
both conflict and consensus.
Hurst writes of antitrust law at greater length. There, the
acceptance of the rules of the game is more problematic. He describes the alteration in American policy between efforts to maximize competition and to increase economic stability. He refers
also to the strong political component, which feared the accumulation of power in private hands, in some antitrust sentiment. He
19. Id. at 242.
20. Hurst suggests that consensus is demonstrated by the fact that all states abandoned regulatory efforts. The absence of regulation in any one state, however, (in an
application, in effect, of Gresham's law to this subject) made such regulation impossible
in any other state. Moreover, even if the abandonment of regulation was a truly independent decision in each state, this does not mean that, within each state, there was not still
significant opposition. Hurst sometimes suggests that continuity demonstrates consensus,
and, at other times, admits the fact of power and the possibility of a consensus only among
the victors. Id. at 220.
21. Id. at 215.
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states that these political, "balance-of-power" views were "not
rejected in a clear-cut debate between political and economic
priorities, but rather -[were] lost to sight in an opportunistic,
unplanned course of action by those charged with enforcing the
antitrust laws." 22 Here, again, what appears to be "conflict" turns
out to be "inertia." Hurst concludes that forty years of antitrust
law failed to evolve into a "reasonably definite and coherent set
of ideas with a firm base in popular understanding and acceptance. "23 The consensus was "ambiguous." 24 It may be simply a
matter of point of view whether one describes a glass as half
empty or half full; Hurst, at any rate, prefers to find, not disagreement, but the failure to reach agreement.
Hurst prefers to discuss issues in which the question of redistribution is muted and can be avoided by a strategy of enlarging
the pie rather than redividing the shares; he avoids those issues
which, in a zero-sum world, must have both winners and losers.
He devotes almost no attention to labor law, finding little of it in
the nineteenth century because "the times had to ripen for effective legal intervention, " 25 an explanation that obviously skirts the
issues of power and class conflict. What conflict existed Hurst
sees as part of a larger consensus; twentieth-century labor law
enforced collective bargaining, reflecting, he feels, a consensus in
favor of "limited, generally peaceful conflict." 26 Hurst also has
almost nothing to say in this chapter about taxation; elsewhere
in the book, he does briefly describe conflict over the extent to
which taxation should redistribute wealth. Here, again, the conflict is part of a larger consensus. "[C]onflict seems to be over
the extent and conditions of such transfer payments, not over the
legitimacy of government use of its resource-allocating authority
to some extent to increase the life options of individuals of small
means." 27
Every legal doctrine, every institutional statement or pattern
of behavior can be viewed as expressing consensus, a shared belief, either a homogeneous response or a conscious compro~ise.
It can, on the other hand, be seen as mediating an underlying
22. Id. at 265.
23. Id. at 257.
24. Id. at 263.
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id. at 236.
27. Id. at 122. Hurst ignores issues like suffrage, apportionment, and prohibition, on
which disagreement was fundamental and no solution could satisfy everyone. See Scheiber, supra note 8, at 752-53.
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contradiction, as attempting to reconcile or hide a potential conflict.
Hurst believes that one of law's primary purposes is to provide society with the information necessary for informed choice,
to force it, for instance, to consider its long-run as well as its
immediate interests. Law in Wisconsin failed, as Hurst so thoroughly explained in Law and Economic Growth, when it let the
lumber industry destroy itself by thoughtless overcutting. Implicit in Hurst's criticism of ·law's failure in this regard is the
belief that, when the costs of activities are revealed, a consensus
responsive to the additional considerations will evolve. But conflict may be more deep-seated, based not on misinformation, but
on well-founded perceptions of opposed interests. At such a time,
a choice between the opposed groups must be made; in such a
circumstance, law's task in reducing social conflict may become
not to reveal where the possible sources of conflict lie, but rather
to hide these social seams, to submerge group conflict, letting
groups and individuals live comfortably with others and with
themselves, without resolving apparently irreconcilable, but not
fatal, conflicts of interest or contradictions in ideology.28
Whether American law reflects consensus or conflict is a
question whose answer may very well reveal more about the author than the subject. Consensus and conflict are as likely to be
approaches to a topic as descriptions of it. Hurst's present interest in consensus and conflict, and his influence within the discipline, suggest that there is a danger that American legal historians, perhaps with Hurst and Horwitz as the standard-bearers,
will now debate the relative merits of these two paradigms.
It will be particularly easy to be adversarial since American
historians have relatively recently engaged in just such a controversy. For several decades, they disputed the merits of consensus
and conflict as descriptions of the American experience. 2g
"Progressive historians" and their progeny discovered repeated
conflict between classes and masses, between the special interests
of property and the principles of egalitarian democracy. They
have portrayed the Jeffersonians, the Populists, the Progressives,
and the New Dealers as recurrent challengers to the asserted
privileges of the propertied. For such scholars, American history
has been discontinuous, as one side or the other, justifying itself
28. This point has been made by Gordon, supra note 10, at 53, among others.
29. See, J. HIGHAM, HISTORY 171-232 (1965).
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on ideological grounds, seized power in what were called revolutions:30 the War for Independence, the Constitutional Convention, Jacksonian Democracy, the Civil War, and the New Deal,
among others.
"Consensus historians," on the other hand, have emphasized
continuity and stability in the American experience. They have
seen American politics, not as the battleground in a struggle between the propertied and the masses, but as an expression of
middle-class values which were shared by most of the population.
Disputes were pragmatic, not ideological; outsiders demanded
equal opportunity, but not a restructuring of society.
It would be particularly unfortunate for legal historians to
recr~ate this debate. It obscures, by the rhetorical excesses it
generates, the similarity between Hurst and Horwitz. For both
historians, the major achievement of°nineteenth-century law was
the creation of a system of market capitalism. While Horwitz is
more explicitly critical of this result, Hurst does not accord it
unqualified approval: "bastard pragmatism" is, after all, hardly
a term of approbation. And while Hurst does not claim that what
happened was good for everyone, Horwitz does not actually accuse law-makers of disingenuousness in appealing to the public
good as a criterion of decision. Much of the divergence between
them reflects differing evaluations of the extent of ideological
opposition to the prevailing ethos. Both, moreover, generally
limit their researches to legal materials. Hurst does not look to
literature, or to sermons, for instance, to see if they reveal attitudes about individualism or economic growth similar to those
expressed in legal materials, an investigation which might help
corroborate his claim that law in these regards simply reflected
popular values. Horwitz does not examine the hard economic
data that might demonstrate the extent to which law did affect
economic growth or the distribution of wealth. 31
With so much of American legal history still unexplored, it
is tempting to over-generalize: to assume the representative na30. These might just as easily be called "transformations." This is the kind of conflict
that Horwitz describes, but Hurst rejects.
31. See Williams, Book Review, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1187, 1210-14 (1978). Both Hurst
and Horwitz also tend to use regional materials to make generalizations about the entire
nation. In his review of Horwitz, (Hurst, supra note 17, at 176), Hurst notes that Horwitz
focuses on the eastern seaboard, especially the middle and New England states. Hurst
himself has been criticized for taking Wisconsin, especially considering that state's refusal
to undertake internal improvements directly, as representative of the United States in
general. See Scheiber, supra note 8, at 753.
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ture of a relatively narrow body of primary materials or to support
large abstractions on a fragile base.
A debate over consensus and conflict is particularly vulnerable to such over-generalization because the legal historian can
too easily borrow an already developed rhetoric. Consensus and
conflict are certainly not inappropriate categories of analysis and
it may even be that one or the other best describes the character
of American legal history, but much careful and particularized
research is needed to confirm such a judgment. Moreover, consensus and conflict are only appropriate categories; they are not
the only categories and it would be unfortunate to ignore the
possibility of different theoretical structures. Hurst himself
concludes that consensus and conflict are both present in most
situations and implies that efforts would better be spent examining agreement, conflict, compromise, and inertia in particular
circumstances. Such exhortations for future research are useful,
but are needed less than is the research itself, the kind that
Hurst has in the past so impressively produced.

